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COMMENTARY ON THE BUSINESS PROFITS ARTICLE 
CONTAINED IN DOUBLE TAX TREATIES SIGNED BY IBERO-
AMERICAN COUNTRIES 
 
 
Aitor Navarro 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid1 
 
 
 
Abstract: This is the first publication of a series of draft papers referred to the content of the 
Double Tax Treaties signed by Ibero-American countries, i.e. Latin American countries plus 
Brazil, Portugal and Spain. The present contribution refers to the business profits article, mostly 
patterned according to article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention, from which it departs to 
give an overview of the scope, rationale and purpose of this provision, as well as relevant 
deviations from such a modelled reference. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
 
The distribution of taxing powers on business profits at the international level is has been 
traditionally based on the benefit principle, according to which if a non-resident 
accomplishes a certain threshold presence in a State, it is considered that a sufficient 
economic allegiance exists to legitimate the taxation of profits derived from its activity, 
as it enjoys the services the State provide in its territory2. Since the consensus achieved 
by the international community in the first half of the twentieth century on the fact that 
such allocation key must mainly refer to physical presence, the “permanent 
establishment” (PE) notion within Double Tax Conventions (DTCs) has been paramount 
to evaluate such degree of attachment. Therefore, if according to the requisites provided 
by applicable law, an alien has a PE at its disposal, the source State (the State in which 
the permanent establishment exist) will be entitled to tax those profits that are attributable 
to it. Indeed, the whole the Ibero-American DTC network follows such approach3, with 
the sole exception of the Andean Community DTC4 and the DTC signed between 
Argentina and Bolivia5, that follow a pure source rule on business profits. 
 
This framework is replicated in almost every DTC in force nowadays. The OECD, UN 
and US Model Tax Conventions also follow it in the rules on the distribution of taxing 
powers on business profits6. Besides, many States use the PE concept in their domestic 
law to assimilate the tax treatment of the profits that are attributable to it to the taxation 
                                                     
2 See SKAAR, A. (1991) Permanent Establishment. Erosion of a Tax Treaty Principle (Deventer: Kluwer 
Law and Taxation Publishers), p.27-29. ESCRIBANO LÓPEZ, E. (2015) “An Opportunistic, and yet 
Appropriate, Revision of the Source Threshold for the Twenty-First Century Tax Treaties” (Intertax, vol.41, 
n.1, p.6-13), p.7-8.  
3 The Ibero-American DTC network comprises more than 420 treaties in force, plus the Andean Community 
DTC. Please note that this paper was drafted taking into account DTCs in force in December 30th, 2018.  
4 “Art.6 Business Profits” of the Decision 578 of the Andean Pact: “Profits resulting from entrepreneurial 
activities may only be taxed by the Member State in which they take place”. Notwithstanding, if an 
enterprise performs business activities in two or more states, the arm’s length principle is adopted to 
attribute profits to determine the amount each jurisdiction may tax.  
5 Art.7 states: “Profits resulting from business activities shall be taxable only by the Contracting State in 
which such business activities have been carried on. Where an enterprise carries on activities in both 
Contracting States, each of them may tax the income, gains or profits derived from within its territory. An 
enterprise of one of the Contracting States shall not be deemed to be carrying on activities in the other 
Contracting State by virtue of the mere fact that it does business in that last-mentioned State through a 
broker, commission agent or other independent agent acting in the normal course of his activities” 
6 Art.7.2 OECD 2014 MTC, art.7.2 UN 2011 MTC, art.7.2 2016 US 2016 MTC. 
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of profits of resident enterprises. This notion may also be found within DTCs, envisaged 
in the non-discrimination provision7.  
 
Art.7 deal with the allocation on taxing powers referred to business profits. This article 
has been one of the most stable ones within the UN MTC, i.e. the wording has remained 
practically the same throughout the years. Also, in the OECD MTC, the configuration of 
the provisions within the article has remained unchanged up until 2010, when a 
comprehensive review of its content took place. Despite this fact, the rationale of the new 
and the old version of art.7 remained the same, as it will be shown below. In that sense, 
it may be affirmed that the underlying logic of the article has endured stable since the first 
OECD MTC came into light. 
 
Almost all the DTCs signed between Ibero-American countries with their treaty partners 
worldwide are based on the structure of the OECD pre-2010 MTC version of art.7. 
Indeed, a significant number of DTCs plainly follow the wording of the OECD pre-2010 
MTC version of art.78. It is structured as follows: 
 Art.7.1 determines that the residence States has taxing rights over business 
income. Nonetheless, if a PE exist in the other State in accordance with the 
definition provided in the Convention (art.5), profits attributable to it may be 
taxed in that other State. 
 Art.7.2 introduces the “functionally separate enterprise” notion that is paramount 
to attribute profits to PEs. The content of such fiction is analyzed below in section 
2.1. 
 Art.7.3 allows the deduction of expenses incurred for the purposes of the PE. 
                                                     
7 Art.24.3 of the OECD states: “The taxation on a permanent establishment which an enterprise of a 
Contracting State has in the other Contracting State shall not be less favorably levied in that other State 
than the taxation levied on enterprises of that other State carrying on the same activities”. The wording is 
the same as the one envisaged in art.24.3 UN 2011 MTC and art.24.2 US 2016 MTC. 
8 Treaties of Bolivia (with France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom), Brazil (with China), 
Chile (with Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Croatia, Denmark, Ecuador, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Paraguay, 
Peru, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Switzerland and Thailand), Colombia (with Chile, Czech Republic, 
Mexico and Switzerland), Cuba (with Barbados, China, Portugal, Russia and Spain) Dominican Republic 
(with Spain), Ecuador (with Belgium, Chile, China, France, Italy, Romania, Singapore and Switzerland), 
El Salvador (with Spain), Mexico (with Colombia, Germany, Hungary, Japan and Switzerland), Panama 
(with Czech Republic, France, Ireland, South Korea, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Singapore, Spain 
and the United Arab Emirates), Paraguay (with Chile), Peru (with Chile and Switzerland), Portugal (with 
Bahrain, Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Guinea-Bissau, Hong 
Kong, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macau, Malta, Moldova, Morocco, 
Netherlands, Pakistan, Panama, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Singapore, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Switzerland, Tunisia, Ukraine and the United Arab Emirates), Spain (with Armenia, Bolivia, 
Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Pakistan, Panama, 
Poland, Romania, Senegal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland), Uruguay (with Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Portugal and Switzerland) and Venezuela (with Belarus, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland). 
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 Art.7.4 refers to the applicability of apportionment methods. As demonstrated in 
section 2.2., this provision is meaningless due to the fact that the outcome must 
be in accordance with the “functionally separate enterprise” parameter. 
 Art.7.5 leaves out of the calculation of the profits attributable to PEs, those that 
arise by reason of the mere purchase by that permanent establishment of goods 
or merchandise for the enterprise. 
 Art.7.6 calls for the application of the same method to attribute profits to PEs 
year by year. Notwithstanding, as per art.7.4, this is an empty provision, as 
necessarily the only method to allocate profits that will always be used is the 
“functionally separate enterprise” one. 
 Art.7.7 determines the prevalence of the articles of the Convention that refer to 
specific items of income over art.7. 
  
Only two DTCs signed by Panama adopted the new 2010 OECD version of art.79.  
 
The exact wording of the UN MTC was followed only by the DTC signed between 
Panama and Vietnam. Particularities arising from this Model, as compared to the OECD 
one, are the following: 
 A limited force of attraction rule is included in art.7.1. 
 Limitations on certain expenses are envisaged in art.7.3. 
 There is no provision equivalent to art.7.5 commented before, albeit the UN 
included a note in which it recommends the States to consider its inclusion during 
negotiations. 
 
Many omissions and/or variations to the language present in both models have been 
introduced by the signatory States. Some are referred to modifications introduced in UN 
MTC specific clauses, i.e. the force of attraction one and the limitation of expenses one. 
Other are not based in any of the provisions envisaged in either of the commented models, 
i.e. clauses referred to the scope of art.7, insurance clauses, anti-deferral clauses, 
provisions referred to the definition of the term “profits”, as well as other clauses. All 
these deviations will be mentioned and analyzed below. 
 
 
1.2. A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON THE PROVISION 
 
As it is well known, in the framework of the League of Nations, during the 1920s and the 
first half of the 1930s, the foundations of the principles informing international taxation 
and double taxation conventions were established along several reports and model 
conventions elaborated by experts at that time, in accordance with business reality and 
the willing of the States that formed part of such organization. The issue of how to allocate 
taxing powers on business income generated by an undertaking operating in two or more 
                                                     
9 Treaties of Panama (with Israel and the United Kingdom). 
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countries was probably the most challenging one, as this item of income was the most 
relevant in cross-border scenarios and the use of wholly owned subsidiaries was neither 
prevalent, nor legally possible, in many countries10. 
 
The dawn of such a process took place when, in 1922, seven officials from European 
countries were appointed to analyze the issues of double taxation and tax evasion. This 
group released a report and resolutions which contained certain guidance on how to tax 
income derived from permanent establishments11 -although such naming was not already 
in use-. It was stated that: 
 
“If the enterprise has its head office in one of the States and in another has a 
branch, an agency, an establishment, a stable commercial or industrial 
organisation, or a permanent representative, each one of the contracting States 
shall tax that portion of the net income produced in its own territory. Therefore, 
the financial authorities of the interested States shall be able to request the 
taxpayer to hand in general balance-sheets, special balance-sheets and all other 
relevant documents”12. 
 
Therefore, as soon as in 1925, the rationale of current distribution rules on business profits 
was enclosed in issued recommendations on the subject matter. Some sort of presence in 
the State of origin (source) was already required. Also, the resolution suggested the 
adoption either of a tax credit or exemption on the State of residence of the undertaking 
to relieve double taxation. As regards the method to attribute profits to permanent 
establishments, the issue was defined as the most difficult one the reporters had to face. 
The use of separate accounting books was proposed, probably inspired by the solution 
adopted in the Czechoslovakia-Italy Income Tax Treaty (1924)13. Also, a reference to 
formulaic methods based on relevant pointers that depended on the performed business 
activity was included. 
 
Later on, in 1927, a report elaborated by officials from 12 countries that resulted in the 
Draft of a Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of Double Taxation was presented. As 
regards business income, the accounting-based method proposed in 1925 was adopted, 
albeit apportionment rules were endorsed for those cases in which the accounts of the 
enterprise were not available. Art.5 of the mentioned model convention provided: 
 
                                                     
10 SASSEVILLE, J.; VANN, R. (2014) “Commentary on article 7” /in/ VANN, R. (ed.) Global Tax Treaties 
Commentaries (Amsterdam: IBFD), section 1.2.1.1. 
11 See League of Nations: Technical Experts to the Economic and Financial Committee Double Taxation 
and Tax Evasion Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Committee 
Document F.212, February 1925. 
12 Ibid. Resolution I-C, at p. 31. 
13 SASSEVILLE, J.; VANN, R. (2014) “Commentary on article 7”, section 1.2.1.3.3. 
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“1. Income from any industrial, commercial or agricultural undertaking and from 
any other trades or professions shall be taxable in the State in which the persons 
controlling the undertaking or engaged in the trade or profession possess a 
permanent establishment. 
... 
3. Should the undertaking possess permanent establishments in both Contracting 
States, each of the two States shall tax the portion of the income produced in its 
territory. 
4. In the absence of accounts showing this income separately and in proper form, 
the competent administrations of the two Contracting States shall come to an 
arrangement as to the rules for apportionment.” 
 
In 1928, the General Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion took a step back on the support for accounting and instead preferred the 
apportionment method as agreed by the involved Contracting States. Notwithstanding, 
the solution was not entirely satisfactory, as once again there was a recommendation to 
appoint a group of experts representing different legal and tax systems to approach the 
issue.  
 
In 1929, the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations issued a questionnaire on 
attribution of profits to member countries. In 1930, answers were studied and it was 
agreed that a thorough study was needed. Thereafter, a Rockefeller Foundation grant was 
conceded to Mitchell B. Carroll, who visited up to 27 countries and addressed the issue, 
among many others, in a five-volume report14. This work forms the basis for the 
elaboration by the mentioned Committee of a Multilateral Convention model “for the 
Allocation of Business Income between States for the Purposes of Taxation”, issued in 
1933. Art.1 of this document contained the relevant rule on business income:  
 
“An enterprise having its fiscal domicile in one of the Contracting States shall not 
be taxable in another Contracting State except in respect of income directly 
derived from sources within its territory and, as such, allocable, in accordance 
with the articles of this Convention, to a permanent establishment situated in such 
State”. 
 
                                                     
14 See the work of Mitchell B. Carroll and Ralph Jones on the subject matter: CARROLL, M.; JONES, R. 
(1932 -1933) Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises, vols. 1-3 (League of Nations). CARROLL, M. 
(1933) Volume 4. Methods of Allocating Taxable Income, (League of Nations) and JONES, R. (1933) 
Volume 5 Allocation Accounting for the Taxable Income of Industrial Enterprises (League of Nations). 
CARROLL recommended that PEs should be treated “in so far as possible as independent entities, in order 
that the income allocated to a branch may be equivalent to that which would have been derived by an 
independent enterprise.”. See VANN, R. (2006) “Tax Treaties: The Secret Agent's Secrets” (British Tax 
Review, n.3, p.345-382), p.364. KOBETSKY, M. (2011) International Taxation of Permanent 
Establishments (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.194. 
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On the other hand, art.3 contains a provision on the attribution of profits to permanent 
establishments: 
 
“If an enterprise with its fiscal domicile in one Contracting State has permanent 
establishments in other Contracting States, there shall be attributed to each 
permanent establishment the net business income which it might be expected to 
derive if it were an independent enterprise engaged in the same or similar 
activities under the same or similar conditions. Such net income will, in principle, 
be determined on the basis of the separate accounts pertaining to such 
establishment. Subject to the provisions of this Convention, such income shall be 
taxed in accordance with the legislation and international agreements of the State 
in which such establishment is situated” (emphasis added). 
 
The project was not successful and was abandoned in 1935, when countries agreed on a 
framework based on bilateral conventions. In both the multilateral and bilateral models, 
only business profits attributable to PEs could be taxed at source, according to the 
separate accounts pertaining to such establishment. Also, empirical -apportionment- 
methods were allowed in the absence of accounts that can be appropriately adjusted, or 
with the agreement of the enterprise. According to SASSEVILLE and VANN, the first 
treaties to incorporate such a rule were the DTC between Canada and the United States 
(1942) and the DTC between the United Kingdom and the United States (1945). 
 
Albeit the Mexico Model of 1943 contained a source-based rule for business profits -
unless these resulted from “isolated or occasional transactions”-, this approach was later 
rejected in the London Model, in which the separate enterprise principle based on the 
attribution of profits to permanent establishments was again adopted. The next 
development on the subject matter took place under the aegis of the OEEC Fiscal 
Committee, where a “Report on the Allocation of Profits to Permanent Establishments 
and Subsidiary Companies” released in 1960 formed the basis for article 7 of the 1963 
OECD Draft Model Convention. Article 7 of the 1963 draft convention provided: 
 
“1. The profits of an enterprise of a Contracting State shall be taxable only in that 
State unless the enterprise carries on business in the other Contracting State 
through a permanent establishment situated therein. If the enterprise carries on 
business as aforesaid, the profits of the enterprise may be taxed in the other State 
but only so much of them as is attributable to that permanent establishment. 
2. Where an enterprise of a Contracting State carries on business in the other 
Contracting State through a permanent establishment situated therein, there shall 
in each State be attributed to that permanent establishment the profits which it 
might be expected to make if it were a distinct and separate enterprise engaged in 
the same or similar activities under the same or similar conditions and dealing 
wholly independently with the enterprise of which it is a perm- anent 
establishment. 
   9 
3. In the determination of the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be 
allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the 
permanent establishment including executive and general administrative expenses 
so incurred, whether in the State in which the permanent establish- ment is situated 
or elsewhere.” 
 
This provision remained practically unchanged until the OECD 2010 MTC was released, 
being the only variation a minor one, namely, the inclusion of the words “subject to the 
provisions of paragraph 3” at the beginning of article 7.2 in the 1977 model. From that 
moment onwards, significant changes were introduced in the Commentaries that alter 
mainly the recognition of expenses and the methodology to calculate profits attributable 
to a PE, to approximate its treatment to that of independent enterprises. As the present 
contribution does not focus on the analysis of the content of the Commentaries, it is 
considered that the simple mention of the reports should suffice for the purposes of the 
present section15. In particular, the following milestones may be quoted: 
1. 1994: report Attribution of Income to Permanent Establishments, incorporated 
into the 1994 version of the OECD MTC Commentaries. 
2. 2001: discussion draft on general topics (Part I) and topics referred to the PEs of 
banking enterprises (Part II). 
3. 2003: discussion drafts of a revised version of Part II and of a new Part III dealing 
with PEs of enterprises carrying on global trading of financial instruments. 
4. 2004: discussion drafts of revised versions of the described Parts I, II and III; 
5. 2005: discussion draft of Part IV dealing with PEs of insurance companies; 
6. 2006: final versions of Part I, Part II and Part III. 
7. 2007: new version of Part IV. 
8. 2008: final version of the OECD Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments which included slightly modified versions of Parts I, II, III and 
IV. Also, that year, changes were adopted in the new version of the Commentary 
on Article 7 of the OECD MTC; 
9. 2008: publication as a discussion draft of a proposed new article 7 of the OECD 
Model and changes to the Commentary on Article 7 of the OECD Model; 
10. 2009: discussion draft of a revised version of the new article 7 of the OECD Model 
and changes to the Commentary on Article 7 of the OECD Model. 
11. 2010: adoption of the new version of article 7 and changes to the Commentary on 
Article 7 of the OECD MTC, together with an updated version of the 
accompanying report which reflected the changes made to article 7 of the OECD 
Model. 
 
According to the OECD, the modification of the wording of art.7 in the OECD 2010 MTC 
had to take place because that the content of the mentioned reports went beyond the 
                                                     
15 For an in-depth analysis on the subject, see RUSSO, R. (2006) “Report on the historical development of 
article 7 of the OECD model” /in/ The Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (IFA Cahiers de 
droit fiscal international, p.89-108). 
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content of the pre-2010 version of this provision16. Notwithstanding, as it will be 
sustained below, there is no reason to interpret the new version of art.7 differently from 
the prior version, which actually constitutes the basis of almost all DTCs signed within 
the Ibero-American network. 
 
On the side of the UN, an ad hoc Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between Developed 
and Developing Countries was conformed in 1967. Before the first UN MTC was released 
in 1980, the “Guidelines for Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries” 
and the “Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries” already contained certain mentions to the issue of allocation of 
taxing powers on business income. The proposals were included in the referred Model 
and remained unchanged since then. Neither the UN 2011 MTC nor the 2017 version 
reflect the review of the wording of art.7 undertaken by the OECD. 
  
                                                     
16 OECD (2010) Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, par.5 et seq. 
SASSEVILLE, J.; VANN, R. (2014) “Commentary on article 7”, section 1.2.3.3. 
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2. RATIONALE OF THE ATTRIBUTION OF PROFITS IN 
THE OECD AND THE UN MTCs 
 
 
 
2.1. THE ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD AS THE BENCHMARK TO 
ATTRIBUTE PROFITS TO PEs 
 
Once the existence of a PE according to the definition of art.5 has been ascertained, the 
truly relevant content of art.7 consists in the attribution of profits to it, to quantitatively 
determine the source State power to tax in the case of business profits. Therefore, the 
correct attribution is crucial to correctly determine the tax burden that an alien enterprise 
must bear in the State in which a PE exist17. Although many approaches exist to appraise 
the issue, the most widespread consists in treating the PE as if it were a functionally 
separate entity18, independent from its head office19. The profits generated due to the 
commercial and financial relations performed by the PE with third parties and the rest of 
the parts of the enterprise -other PEs and the head office-20 should be attributed to it. This 
fiction emulates the separate enterprise notion that governs corporate taxation since the 
raise of modern tax systems in the dawn of the twentieth century, namely the taxation of 
profits that each enterprise individually obtains, even if the enterprise is integrated in a 
group. An indispensable accompaniment is the arm’s length principle, that determines the 
need to perform valuation adjustments to related parties’ transactions as to resemble the 
outcome independent parties would have agreed on under identical or quite similar 
circumstances21. 
 
As a consequence of the adoption of the separate enterprise principle, the rules on 
attribution of profits to PEs and transfer pricing rules are quite similar22, as the former are 
based on the latter. As a matter of fact, this resemblance makes perfect sense if one departs 
from a neutrality perception, this is, from the idea that the tax treatment of foreign direct 
                                                     
17 The reference to the adequate attribution of profits must be read as well as referring to the adequate 
attribution of losses. See in the same vein, OECD (2010) Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments, par.3. 
18 OECD (2010) Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, par.50. BAKER, P.; 
COLLIER, R. (2006) “General Report" /in/ The Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments (IFA 
Cahiers de droit fiscal international), p.26. 
19 The “separate enterprise” concept has remained unchanged since the very first time it was formulated, 
see SASSEVILLE, J; VANN, R. (2016) “Article 7: Business Profits”, p.37. 
20 BENNET, M.; RUSSO, R. (2009) “Discussion Draft on a New Art. 7 of the OECD Model Convention” 
(International Transfer Pricing Journal, vol.16, n.2, p.73-80), p.76. 
21 See Art.9.1 OECD 2014 MTC, art.9.1 UN 2011 MTC, art.9.1 US 2016 MTC. 
22 SASSEVILLE, J.; VANN, R. (2014) “Commentary on article 7”, p.4. 
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investment through subsidiaries or through PEs should receive the same treatment23. 
Notwithstanding, there will always be differences within tax law related to the choose of 
either alternative24, as a subsidiary has legal personality and full capacity to act and 
conclude contracts that may entail the segregation between functions, assets and risks, 
whereas the PE, by definition, cannot perform such tasks. For instance, if a PE uses a 
tangible asset to perform entrepreneurial functions, normally it will not be considered that 
such use derives from a deemed leasing agreement with the head office25, but the 
economic ownership will be exclusively attributed to the PE and therefore, there would 
be no need for deemed payments derived from the use of the asset to take place. On the 
other hand, in a parent-subsidiary scenario, a leasing agreement could be perfectly 
possible, i.e. the subsidiary could enjoy the asset while the parent would remain as the 
formal owner, and payments on the use should be performed in this scenario. In this latter 
case, the content of the written agreement is paramount, being this element inexistent in 
the case of a head office-PE scenario. 
 
Besides, there are other relevant differences that should be taken into account. First, both 
the head office and the PE share the very same credit rating26, while a parent and its 
subsidiaries may display dissimilar creditworthiness and thus, be not equally positioned 
to access to financial markets27. Second, it is not possible for a PE to guarantee the debt 
attributable to the head office nor vice versa28, while in a parent-subsidiary setting it is. 
Third, capitalization needs of a subsidiary compared to those of a PE are quite different. 
A subsidiary usually must comply with regulatory requirements posed in non-tax 
regulations, while the PE is not constrained by the same limitations to decide upon its 
                                                     
23 DZIURDZ, K. (2014) “Attribution of Functions and Pro ts to a Dependent Agent PE: Different Arm’s 
Length Principles under Articles 7(2) and 9?” (World Tax Journal, vol.6, n.2, p.135-167), p.145. 
MALHERBE, J. DAENEN, P. (2010) “Permanent Establishments Claim Their Share of Profits: Does the 
Taxman Agree?”, p.361. BLACK, A. (2010) “Attribution of Profits to PEs – Implications of the 
‘Authorized’ OECD Approach (Part 1)” (Journal of International Taxation, Vol.21, n.2, p.19-29, 62-64), p. 
20.  
24 SASSEVILLE, J.; VANN, R. (2014) “Commentary on article 7”, p.8. BAKER, P.; COLLIER, R. (2006), 
p.26. 
25 Cfr. SCHNITGER, A. (2013) “Comments on the Klaus Vogel Lecture – Problems Arising under 
Domestic Tax Law Due to the Introduction of the Authorised OECD Approach” (Bulletin for International 
Taxation, vol.67, n.4/5, p.211-215), p.213. 
26 OECD (2008) Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, par.36, 132. 
27 See YONG, S.Y. (2012) “Tax Optimization Using Branches?” (Bulletin for International Taxation, 
vol.66, n.8, p.424-435), p.427. All in all, the creditworthiness of a subsidiary may be increased due to the 
fact that the one of its parent company is higher. This effect is known as passive association. See OECD 
2015 Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10 – 2015 Final Reports, 
par.1.157 et seq. See The Queen v. General Capital Canada Inc. (2010) FCA 344 (Canadian Federal Court 
of Appeals). See BOIDMAN, N. (2011) “Pricing Canada-U.S. Guarantees After GE Capital: Still 
Evolving” (Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report, vol.19, n.19, p.1042-1051), p.1044. LINDSAY, P.; 
POON, C. (2014) “Transfer Pricing in Canada: Maturing Jurisprudence will Guide the Next Wave of 
Disputes” (Transfer Pricing International Journal, vol.15, n.7, 6 p.), p.3. 
28 OECD (2008) Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, par.36, 134, 135. 
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finance structure. Fourth, a PE does not have shareholders, a subsidiary does29. Fifth, the 
outcome of transactions agreed by a parent and a subsidiary has implications beyond tax 
law, while the deemed agreements between the PE and the head office are irrelevant out 
of that field, as the PE notion constitutes a fiction created only for tax purposes30. 
 
Other relevant difference derives from the wording of art.7 as envisaged in the UN MTC 
and the pre-2010 OECD MTCs, which -as already stated- serve as reference for almost 
the entire Ibero-american DTC network. The nuance has to do with losses recognition. 
While in the 2010 OECD MTC version of art.7 an enterprise could display losses in 
aggregated terms, but could obtain profits at the level of the PE -profits that could be 
taxed by the State in which it is present-, in the former mentioned models the taxation of 
profits within the PE is not possible if the enterprise as a whole displayed losses in a given 
taxable period 31.  
 
Therefore, the rules on attribution of profits to PEs may be tailored to approximate the 
tax treatment of a PE to that of a subsidiary, but a complete alignment cannot take place32. 
In fact, some authors doubt on whether the assimilation of both regimes is desirable from 
the perspective of the equality principle, as both scenarios are not comparable due to the 
reasons explained in the prior paragraph33. 
 
Under the described framework, it is appropriate to pinpoint some relevant aspects on the 
attribution of income to PEs, as to briefly describe its content. The allocation of taxing 
powers within DTCs is normally referred to items of income, to qualification issues, but 
not to valuation matters referred to the calculation of the taxable base34. Nonetheless, the 
rules on attribution of income to PEs are a clear exception to such general standard, as 
                                                     
29 BURGERS, I. (2009) “The New OECD Approach on Profit Allocation: a Step Towards Neutral 
Treatment of Permanent Establishments and Subsidiares”, p.73. 
30 MOERER, O.; KLAVER, B. (2015) “The AOA, PE status and BEPS, some reassurance in a time of 
change?” (Transfer pricing international journal, vol.16, n.4), p.1590. 
31 See OECD (2010) Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, par.8. BURGERS, 
I. (2009) “The New OECD Approach on Profit Allocation: a Step Towards Neutral Treatment of Permanent 
Establishments and Subsidiares” (Florida Tax Review, vol.10, n.1, p.51-76), p.59. OOSTERHOFF, D. 
(2008) “The True Importance of Significant People Functions” (International Transfer Pricing Journal, 
vol.15, n.2, p.68-75), p.69. BENNET, M.; RUSSO, R. (2007) “OECD Project on Attribution of Profits to 
Permanent Establishments: An Update” (International Transfer Pricing Journal, vol.14, n.5, p.279-284), 
p.279. KOBETSKY, M. (2011) International Taxation of Permanent Establishments, p.198-199. 
32 MALHERBE, J. DAENEN, P. (2010), p.361. BERNALES SORIANO, R. (2013) “The Authorized 
OECD Approach: An Overview” /in/ GUTIÉRREZ, C.; PERDELWITZ, A. (eds.) Taxation of Business 
Profits in the 21st Century (Amsterdam: IBFD, p. 135-181), p.12.  
33 PANAYI, C. (2013) “The Taxation of Permanent Establishments: Selected Issues” (Bulletin for 
International Taxation, vol.67, n.4/5, p.226-237), p.229 express the same doubts in the context of the CJEU 
case law on the subject matter. 
34 That said, it has be mentioned that transfer pricing rules may cause an impact in the allocation of taxing 
rights in those cases in which a jurisdiction performs adjustments within items of income if such 
adjustments entail a requalification outcome from the perspective of the DTC allocation rules, i.e. arts. 6 to 
21.  
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the resulting figure entails a limitation for the source jurisdiction to tax PEs business 
income, and constitutes a reference for the residence jurisdiction to appropriately 
eliminate double taxation. 
 
DTC attribution rules are applicable autonomously, as their aim is to determine the profits 
that are to be allocated to a PE as a concept defined in the very same Convention. 
Consequently, in order to ascertain the tax treatment of business income, it will always 
be necessary to also apply domestic rules on the determination of the taxable base where 
the EP lies. If the amount of profits determined by domestic rules is higher than the 
amount that results from attribution rules at the DTC level, the latter will act as a barrier. 
If, on the contrary, the amount is lower, the DTC limit will not play a role. This rationale 
is similar to that of percentage limits normally used in the context of passive income, 
although applied in the context of the calculation of the taxable base, instead of the taxable 
rate.  
 
The separate enterprise principle is quite a generic parameter that must be concretized. 
To that effect, along many decades, the OECD has published a series of recommendations 
that many States have followed not only to interpret and apply the article referred to 
business profits in their DTC network, but also to implement domestic rules on the subject 
matter. The referred guidelines have been sharpen over the years, as the OECD 
approached the issue more and more deeply through the publications of various reports, 
the content of which has impacted the interpretation of the “functionally separate 
enterprise notion” over time. While in the section referred to the historical background, 
the referred reports were mentioned, hereby two aspects will be underscored as the main 
drivers of change on the viewpoint of the OECD. 
 
On the one hand, it relevant to emphasize that the methodology to allocate profits to PEs 
has evolved from a mere accounting analysis to a thorough examination of functions, 
assets and risks attributable to the PE, being these elements the ones that, at the end of 
the day, define the functionally separate enterprise fiction in accordance with its 
economically relevant characteristics. To this analysis, a second stage is added by which 
the revenues and expenses derived from deemed agreements between the PE and its home 
office, other parts of the enterprise, or transactions with third parties are taken into 
account. In this phase, the arm’s length standard notion is paramount. This two-stage 
methodology has been labelled as the “Authorized OECD Approach” (AOA). 
 
That said, the AOA does not entail a breach with the former approach -based on the 
accounting of the PE-, but an improvement and refinement of it35. The difference between 
both strands lies in the fact that guidance on the enforcement of the AOA are fairly more 
detailed and specific than a generic reference to accounting. Indeed, the use of accounting 
                                                     
35 In the same vein, see BENNETT, M. (2008) “The Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments: 
The 2008 Commentary on Art. 7 of the OECD Model Convention” (European Taxation, vol.46, n.1, p.467-
471), p.469. 
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records has to be based in real facts, as the AOA does, and therefore both should lead to 
the same result. Indeed, the attribution of functions, assets and risks is of great aid to 
ascertain whether the accountings of a PE reflect real facts or are inaccurate or incorrect 
in that regard36. Therefore, if the documentation prepared by the taxpayer correctly 
reflects the existing functions performed, assets used and risks assumed, as well as the 
outcome of the dealings with the rest of the enterprise and third parties, the resulting 
allocation of profits should be respected37. It is therefore easy to ascertain the importance 
of documentation both in a parent-subsidiary setting and that of a head office and a PE. 
Indeed, coherence demands for PEs to be required to fulfill the same -or very similar- 
accounting duties as resident enterprises bear38. 
 
On the other hand, the methodology proposed by the OECD has significantly evolved in 
what concerns the recognition of deductible expenses by the PE. The former approach, 
based on restrictions on the deduction of expenses on deemed dealings between the PE 
and the head office has been abandoned in favor of an almost complete alignment on the 
treatment of PEs and subsidiaries. For instance, the OECD 1963 MTC Commentaries 
stipulated that the deduction of deemed royalties or interest payments to the head office 
were not to be allowed, nor payments to compensate costs derived from management or 
auxiliary services should. In fact, it was admitted that such approach was a departure from 
the wording of the provision on business profits proposed in the Model. 
 
It is certainly inadequate to limit the recognition of expenses without normative support 
whatsoever. Indeed, the configuration of the provision on business profits throughout the 
MTCs elaborated by the OECD do not constraints in that regard. Moreover, the very 
OECD implicitly admitted the wrongfulness of its former position due to the changes in 
interpretation along various reports, referred to a rule the wording of which has not varied 
since the first OECD MTC was released. This is a clear indicator of the fact that the 
former position was sustained not as a sensible interpretation of the rule, but because 
other reasons more related to the preservation of the taxable base of the jurisdiction of the 
PE, i.e. due to collection reasons. In this sense, the review on the described approach is 
certainly positive, as it lowers the tension of recommendations based not in a logical 
approach to the configuration of the business profits article, but on goals external to that 
element. Indeed, if the aim was to restrict deductions, the OECD could have established 
                                                     
36 In the context of transfer pricing rules, the importance of documentation within the fact assessment stage 
is important to build a solid point of departure in that regard. See TPG-2010 par.1.52-1.53. OECD (2014) 
BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10. Draft on Revisions to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Including 
Risk, Recharacterisation, And Special Measures), par.2, 3. OECD (2015) Aligning Transfer Pricing 
Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10 – 2015 Final Reports, par.1.42-1.43. 
37 BIRNKRANT, H. (2004) “Through the Looking Glass: the OECD Discussion Draft Treatment of a 
Permanent Establishment as a Functionally Separate Entity” (Tax Management Memorandum), p.127.  
38 Cfr. DZIURDZ, K. (2014) “Attribution of Functions and Pro ts to a Dependent Agent PE: Different 
Arm’s Length Principles under Articles 7(2) and 9?”, p.142. 
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so in the text of the provision, as the UN Model and many DTCs from the Ibero-American 
network do39. 
 
Therefore, the methodology proposed by the OECD from 2008 onwards, namely the 
AOA approach, entails a clear progress if compared to the prior guidance, as it develops 
more sophisticated criteria to regard the PE as a functionally separate entity and abandons 
the illogical position maintained on the deductibility of expenses under the described 
terms. This continuum between the former approach and the new one is a key aspect, as 
it permits to consider that each DTC that follows the logic and structure of art.7 as drafted 
in its current OECD 2014 MTC version, the OECD pre-2010 version and the current UN 
MTC one can be uniformly interpreted on what regards the attribution of income to PEs. 
Of course, many DTCs introduce nuances that will be described below, but the departure 
point is clearly the same40, irrespective of the signature date of each DTC. 
 
Notwithstanding, the issue of the recourse to the AOA to correctly interpret art.7 of the 
Ibero-American DTC network will be dealt with. As stated in the section devoted to the 
historical development of art.7, in 2008, the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA) 
published the report in which the AOA methodology was proposed to be incorporated in 
the OECD MTC Commentaries in two stages. The first stage consisted in the introduction 
of the conclusions of the report within the Commentary on art.7 of the OECD 2008 MTC. 
The second one consisted in the modification of the wording of art.7 and the inclusion of 
additional comments on this newly drafted provision, within the framework of the OECD 
2010 MTC. Curiously enough, the OECD did not remove the 2008 comments, because 
the majority of DTCs in force at that time were drafted in accordance with the former 
wording (pre-2010) and indeed, almost none of the newly negotiated DTCs have been 
drafted using the 2010 wording of art.7. Actually, as stated before, within the entire Ibero-
American DTC network, only two DTCs signed by Panama include such provision41. 
 
Under the described framework, it has been proposed that the AOA methodology should 
only be applied to those DTCs signed after the OECD 2008 MTC Commentaries were 
released. Truth is that such approach is incorrect due to the following reasons. 
 
First, there is no breach in the rationale of the former methodology and the AOA one, as 
previously explained. Therefore, it is irrational to draw a distinction if both must lead to 
the same exact result. 
 
Second, to link the use of the OECD MTC Commentaries to a date referred to the 
negotiation or signature of DTCs entails the recognition of an authorized interpretative 
value to a non-binding source of interpretation without any justification whatsoever. 
                                                     
39 See section 3.2. 
40 The only exceptions are the Multilateral tax convention of the Andean Agreement and the DTC in force 
between Argentina and Bolivia. 
41 Treaties of Panama (with Israel and the United Kingdom). 
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Although the issue of the interpretative value of soft law in this context constitutes a 
relevant debate that merits to be treated in depth, due to the fact that this topic is not 
directly related to the aim of the present contribution, the following brief remarks should 
be enough to support the Commentaries should not have a privileged status over other 
non-binding sources: (1) this instrument lack publicity and the accessibility that should 
comply with any legal rule promulgated on a rule of law jurisdiction (2) the 
Commentaries are not ratified by a democratic institution. This soft law tool is elaborated 
by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs (CFA), which is composed of tax administrations’ 
representatives of OECD Member States (3) the definitive approval of the final document 
takes place on the OECD Council as a recommendation, i.e. as a non-binding instrument. 
The OECD member States are the ones that decide, each time a new version of the 
Commentaries is released, for it to be non-binding. For all these reasons, the version of 
the Commentaries that should be used to interpret art.7 is the one that suits best its 
wording and rationale, in accordance with the limits posed by the very possible meaning 
of its terms. 
 
Third, art.7.2 is, in both the OECD pre-2010 version and the 2010 one, equally ample in 
its setting. The analysis based on functions, assets and risks can be extrapolated to either 
texts, being this a positive aspect, as the AOA approach constitutes the most accurate 
methodology on the implementation of the arm’s length principle in the PE context42. In 
fact, it is easy to ascertain that the wording of each version is almost undifferentiated and 
identical in its content. The 2010 version includes an explicit reference to functions, assets 
and risks while the pre-2010 one does not, but can be inferred from the reference to the 
performance of an independent enterprise “under the same or similar conditions”, which 
involves the analysis of the substance of the PE as a separate business unit that perform 
concrete tasks through given means. In this sense, the attribution of functions, risks and 
assets lead to adequately shape the PE as if it were a distinct and separate enterprise, 
because no other elements exist apart from the mentioned three that could be relevant to 
determine the amount of income a PE would have obtained by its own. 
 
The unitary approach sustained in these lines -apart from the nuance referred to losses 
recognition that has been already commented- leads to assume that, unless other rules 
establish exceptions to the commented methodology, both the domestic rules and the 
DTC ones tailored in accordance with the arm’s length notion as applied in the framework 
of allocation of income to PEs will often lead to a very similar result, which would be the 
one resulting from the guidance determined by the AOA rationale. Thereby, possible 
conflicts due to mismatches are avoided. 
 
The counterweight to all the aforementioned is that the AOA methodology must always 
respect the notion of “functionally separate entity” as reflected in art.7.2. The AOA 
constitutes a suitable mean to interpret such an ample and diffuse criterion, but it cannot 
                                                     
42 In the same vein, see OSTERHOFF, D. (2008) “The True Importance of Significant People Functions”, 
p.73. 
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exceed or contravene its content. Notwithstanding, it is not the purpose of this 
contribution to delve into possible queries that may arise from the commented 
interconnection.  
 
From the next section onwards, deviations from the OECD and the UN models will be 
commented in depth. The force of attraction and the limitation of expenses sections are 
referred to modifications over the wording of UN provisions. The rest of the sections 
reflect clauses that are not based in any of the provisions envisaged in either of the 
commented models. 
 
2.2. ADMISSIBILITY OF APPORTIONMENT METHODS 
 
According to art.7.4 of the 2008 and prior OECD MTC and the UN MTC, insofar as it 
has been customary, Contracting States may determine the profits to be attributed to a 
permanent establishment on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits. 
Notwithstanding, the adopted method shall be such that the result shall be in accordance 
with the principles contained in this Article. 
 
Criteria commonly used to allocate profits according to apportionment are grouped by 
the OECD into three main categories, i.e. those which are based on the receipts of the 
enterprise, its expenses or its capital structure. The first refers to turnover or commission 
proxies, the second focuses on wages and the third on the proportion of the total working 
capital to be allocated to each branch43.  
 
That said, the provision is, by far, the one that has been removed most by Ibero-American 
countries, considering that the OECD 2008 Model has been almost always the point of 
departure within negotiations of the content of art.7. A significant number of DTCs 
dismiss art.7.4 of the mentioned models, while maintaining the rest of the OECD 2008 
MTC provisions intact -except for art.7.6, which is completely useless if art.7.4 is not 
                                                     
43 OECD 2008 MTC Commentaries, par.54. 
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included-44. Also, DTCs that depart to some extent from the OECD 2008 MTC dismiss 
this clause from their wording45. 
 
The disregard of such a clause is fairly meaningful, as its configuration as established in 
the models leads to severe interpretation issues. On the one hand, the provision seems to 
establish an exception to the use of the “functionally separate enterprise” notion 
envisaged in art.7.2, as it enables the use of apportionment methods as long as it is 
customary in the State willing to apply them. These methods require the use of allocation 
criteria that are applied irrespective of whether the outcome matches that of the separate 
enterprise notion; indeed, this is why an express authorization in the text of the 
Convention is needed to use these methods to attribute profits at a DTC level. Otherwise, 
it would not be possible due to the fact that both apportionment and the separate enterprise 
principle are dissimilar.  
 
Notwithstanding, the last requisite for art.7.4 to be applied goes against the mentioned 
rationale, as it requires that the result of applying apportionment must be in line with the 
outcome of the functionally separate enterprise notion, which only in rare occasions will 
coincide. To put it in other words, if the outcome of each methodology differs, then the 
latter will prevail. This means that art.7.4 is pointless, as it will always entail that the 
attribution of profits to PEs will be the result of applying the separate enterprise principle 
enshrined in art.7.2.  
 
                                                     
44 Treaties of Argentina (with Brazil and France), of Brazil (with Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, France, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, 
Sweden, Trinidad and Tobago and Turkey), of Chile (with Brazil, China, Japan, South Korea, New 
Zealand, Spain and Sweden), of Colombia (with Canada, South Korea, Portugal and Spain), of Costa Rica 
(with Spain), of Dominican Republic (with Canada), of Ecuador (with Brazil, Germany and South Korea), 
of Mexico (with Peru and Turkey), of Paraguay (with Taiwan), of Peru (with Brazil, Canada, South Korea, 
Mexico and Portugal), of Portugal (with Algeria, Andorra, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, 
Colombia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, South Korea, Mozambique, Norway, Peru, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey and the United States), of Spain (with Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Barbados, 
Belarus, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Egypt, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, 
Norway, Oman, Portugal, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, Sweden, Tajikistan, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab 
Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan and Venezuela), of Uruguay (with Finland, South Korea, 
Malta, Romania, Singapore, Spain and the United Kingdom) and of Venezuela (with Spain). 
45 Treaties of Argentina (with Australia, Canada, Finland, Italy, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom), of Brazil (with Austria, Mexico, Ukraine), of Chile (with Australia, Canada, China and 
the United Kingdom), of Ecuador (with Canada, Spain and Uruguay), of Mexico (with Australia, Brazil, 
Canada, New Zealand), of Portugal (with India, Senegal and the United Kingdom), of Spain (with 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Ecuador, India, Indonesia, Kuwait, Malaysia, New Zealand, Tunisia), of 
Uruguay (with Ecuador and Vietnam) and of Venezuela (with Canada, Saudi Arabia, Trinidad and Tobago 
and the United Kingdom). 
   20 
Albeit the aforementioned derives from the plain reading of art.7.4, the OECD 2008 MTC 
Commentaries try to reconcile the recognition of the applicability of apportionment 
methods and the principles underlying art.7. Despite it is considered that formulaic 
methods differ from the one envisaged in paragraph 2, it is necessary to “produce figures 
of taxable profit that approximate as closely as possible to the figures that would have 
been produced on a separate accounts basis”46. Such conflict can only be solved by 
affirming the prevalence of the outcome derived from the functionally separate enterprise 
fiction, as explained in the prior paragraph. 
 
All the departures from the wording of art.7.4 within the Ibero-American DTC network 
are drafted to express the same concern, i.e. the fact that the lack of information in a given 
case cannot be an impediment to determine the taxable base, even if such is performed 
by exercise of a discretion or the making of an estimate47. By means of illustration, one 
may quote art.7.4 of the DTC signed between Venezuela and Malaysia:  
 
“If the information available to the competent authority is inadequate to determine 
the profits to be attributed to the permanent establishment of an enterprise, nothing 
in this Article shall affect the application of any law of that State relating to the 
determination of the tax liability of a person by the exercise of a discretion or the 
making of an estimate by the competent authority, provided that the law shall be 
applied, so far as the information available to the competent authority permits, in 
accordance with the principles of this Article”. 
 
A common denominator is again present, namely, that law must be applied consistently 
with the principles of art.7. The main difference in wording lies in the fact that, in some 
DTCs “the result” must be in line with such principles48, while in others, it is stated that 
law shall be applied, “so far as the information available permits”, consistently with the 
principles of this Article49. 
 
As happens with the original wording of art.7.4, this clause does not add new elements to 
be considered as regards the application of art.7 and the separate enterprise principle. To 
put it in other words, should the mentioned deviations not exist, the outcome would be 
the same. It is true that the separate enterprise principle entails a fiction by which profits 
attributable to a PE -yet another tax fiction- are the ones an independent party would have 
obtained in comparable conditions and thus, facts are relevant not only to ascertain the 
applicability of the rule but also to determine the outcome of it. Notwithstanding, despite 
                                                     
46 OECD 2008 MTC Commentaries, par.54. 
47 Treaties of Argentina with Australia, Chile with Malaysia, Cuba with Vietnam, Mexico with Australia, 
Spain (with Australia, Belgium and Malaysia) and Venezuela (with Czech Republic, Indonesia, Kuwait, 
Malaysia, Norway and the United States) 
48 Treaties of Spain with Belgium, and of Venezuela (with Czech Republic, Indonesia and Norway). 
49 Treaties of Chile with Malaysia, Cuba with Vietnam, Spain (with Australia and Malaysia) and of 
Venezuela (with Kuwait, Malaysia and the United States). 
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the fact that the lack of information may cause difficulties in applying the methodology 
described supra, it would be unusual not to have a minimum factual basis derived from, 
at least, evidence assessment by the tax authorities on the essential elements to attribute 
profits according to the separate enterprise notion, being it always the guiding principle 
to be followed. Thus, as the outcome must respect such guidance, a modified art.7.4 
clause referred to the lack of information is merely redundant. 
 
The only provision that may entail additional interpretation issues is the one present in 
the DTC signed between Argentina and Australia, that states the following (art.7.5)50: 
 
“Nothing in this Article shall affect the application of any law of a Contracting 
State relating to the determination of the tax liability of a person, including 
determinations in cases where the information available to the competent 
authority of that State is inadequate to determine the profits to be attributed to a 
permanent establishment, provided that law shall be applied, so far as it is 
practicable to do so, consistently with the principles of this Article” (emphasis 
added). 
 
Here, the domestic method to calculate the profits attributable to a PE could differ from 
the separate enterprise notion envisaged in art.7, but in this case, the former prevails over 
the latter due to the emphasized formulation, i.e. the domestic method must respect so far 
as it is practicable to do so the separate enterprise principle, but if it is not possible due 
to the very nature of the domestic method, such rules would prevail. 
 
Once explained the particular situation of apportionment methods, it is easier to 
understand why this section follows the one referred to the allocation of profits through 
the “functionally separate enterprise” notion, i.e. because both in those DTCs that include 
a clause identical to art.7.4 of the pre-2010 OECD Model and those that remove it from 
the content art.7, follow at the end of the day the same rationale, because according to the 
configuration of the mentioned provision, apportionment methods are not applicable, 
being the only exception in the whole DTC network the last mentioned one (Argentina-
Australia), due to its particular wording. This is the reason why this section was not 
included within the “model deviations” one, because despite the fact that many of the 
mentioned DTCs strictly entail a model deviation, its impact is by all means inexistent. 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
50 An identical wording may be found in the protocol referred to the DTC signed between Mexico and 
Australia. 
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3. MODEL DEVIATIONS 
 
 
3.1. FORCE OF ATTRACTION 
 
The force of attraction rule deviates from a strict attribution of profits in accordance with 
the separate enterprise notion as envisaged in the OECD 2008 MTC. The UN 2011 MTC, 
as well as the prior UN models, include such clause embedded in art.7.1 as to widen 
taxing rights of the source State on what regard business income.  
 
Essentially, the force of attraction rule is designed to attribute taxing powers to the State 
in which a permanent establishment operates, on the profits derived from economic 
activities of the same or similar kind as those effected through that permanent 
establishment. The main reasons to introduce such a clause, apart from the widen of 
taxing rights of the jurisdiction in which a PE exists, are tax avoidance and administrative 
issues51, derived from the fact that the attribution of profits to permanent establishments 
according to functions performed and the activities carried out by the PE usually presents 
significant difficulties that may be soften through a force of attraction rule. 
Notwithstanding, this alleged simplification will not always be such, because similar 
interpretation problems arise within the framework of these rules, e.g. to determine when 
a sale or an economic activity is similar to that performed by a PE, or to ascertain whether 
the taxpayer conducts business in a given jurisdiction by splitting functions alongside the 
PE and the head office to obtain tax advantages. 
 
Many DTCs in the Ibero-American network include such a clause. Especially, Mexico 
and Argentina display a consistent treaty policy in that sense. All of the force of attraction 
clauses are limited ones, which mean that not all the profits derived in a certain 
jurisdiction are attributable to the PE, but only those that can be connected with the 
activities the PE perform or the sales that are made through it. To ascertain such elements, 
it is important to focus on the first step of the AOA methodology, namely, in determining 
whether the PE perform functions that are comparable to those performed by the 
enterprise in the same State but not through the PE.  
 
Some of the DTCs contain the clause as drafted in the UN Model Convention52, but most 
of them depart from its wording53. Detected deviations may be classified into the 
following categories: 
                                                     
51 SASSEVILLE, J.; VANN, R. (2014) “Commentary on article 7”, section 1.1.2.2. 
52 Treaties of Argentina (with Belgium, Canada, Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain and 
Sweden), of Cuba (with Venezuela and Vietnam), of Ecuador (with Uruguay), of Panama (with Vietnam), 
of Portugal (with Indonesia), of Spain (with Argentina, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Thailand), of 
Uruguay (with the United Arab Emirates and Vietnam) and of Venezuela (with Cuba, Indonesia, Russia 
and Saudi Arabia) 
53 Treaties of Argentina (with Australia, Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom), of Chile (with 
Mexico), of Ecuador (with Mexico), of Mexico (with Australia, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, 
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3.1.1. Limited force of attraction on (only) sales. Removal of art.7.1.c) UN MTC. 
 
The first deviation from the UN Model clause simply consists in the removal of letter 
c)54, i.e. it does not add variations to the wording itself, but just erase one part of the 
modelled provision. This entails that, apart from the profits attributable to the PE itself, 
only profits derived from “sales of goods or merchandise of the same or similar kind as 
those sold through that permanent establishment” -letter b)-, but not those profits derived 
from other activities -due to the erase of letter c-, may be taxed in the State in which the 
permanent establishment lies55.  
 
This means that profits derived from economic activities different from sales are excluded 
from the scope of the limited force of attraction rule. For instance, if a PE sells computers, 
but the after-sales service is performed by the head office, profits derived from such 
service cannot be taxed by the source State through the force of attraction rule, if designed 
as stated in this subsection.  
 
What’s more, if the goods or merchandise sold differ from the ones that are being sold 
through the PE -are not of the same or similar kind-, the limited force of attraction rule 
would not apply either. This may entail interpretation issues as to define when such a 
dissimilarity exists. One may say that, for instance, if a PE sells computers and the head 
office sells office equipment in the country in which the PE is present, both are selling 
different goods, but it is also true that computers may form part of regular office gadgetry. 
The wording of the limited force of attraction rule may be thus interpreted differently, 
depending on the taxing powers one may prefer to attribute to the jurisdiction in which 
the PE is present. In order to solve such issues, probably the most balanced solution would 
be for the States to consult between each other on the similarity of the goods sold56. 
 
 
3.1.2. Limited force of attraction on the negotiation and conclusion of contracts. 
                                                     
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Hong Kong, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay), of Panama (with Barbados), of Portugal (with 
Venezuela), of Spain (with Philippines) and of Venezuela (with Barbados, Czech Republic, Denmark and 
Norway). 
54 Art.7.1 letter c) of the UN Model Convention states that the source jurisdiction may tax “other business 
activities carried on in that other State of the same or similar kind as those effected through that permanent 
establishment”. 
55 Treaties of Argentina (with Spain), Mexico (with Belgium, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Indonesia, New 
Zealand, Romania and Ukraine) of Ecuador (with Mexico), Portugal (with Venezuela), Spain (with 
Argentina) and Venezuela (with Barbados, Czech Republic and Portugal). 
56 For instance, this concern is expressly contemplated in the wording of the DTC signed between Spain 
and the Philippines, art.7.1 in fine, stating that “the competent authorities of the Contracting States shall 
consult each other on the similarity of goods sold or business transactions”. 
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This category onwards reflects changes on the wording of the UN force of attraction 
provision. In this case, taxing powers are expanded beyond the breadth of the attribution 
to permanent establishments to cover specific cases not provided on the referred model, 
in which the permanent establishment takes an active and substantial part in the 
negotiation and conclusion of contracts entered into by the enterprise. In these cases, 
 
“[…] there shall be attributed to the permanent establishment such proportion of 
the profits of the enterprise arising out of those contracts as the contribution of the 
permanent establishment to those transactions bears to that of the enterprise as a 
whole”. 
 
It is certainly striking to notice the resemblance of this provision, which is present in the 
DTCs signed between United Kingdom with Argentina and Mexico, with the concerns 
expressed during the BEPS project on the avoidance of the PE status57. But even more 
surprising, the first mentioned DTC entered into force in 1997, and the second one in 
1994, more than 20 years before the implementation of the new permanent establishment 
definition in the Multilateral Convention58. Curiously enough, these provisions do expand 
significantly the taxing powers of the source State, if compared with the attribution of 
profits resulting from the new PE definition that derived from the BEPS project59. In this 
latter scenario, the new PE definition does not lead to a higher attribution of income to 
the PE, but only expands the limits of the PE concept. It is indeed complicated to see how 
a broader delineation of the dependent agent notion serves the purpose of tackling base 
erosion and profit shifting, if one takes into account that the dependent agent is already a 
resident taxpayer either under the CIT or the PIT of the jurisdiction in which agency 
activities are being performed. Thus, the outcome in revenue terms remain the same. On 
the other hand, in the commented provision, a direct relationship between the actions of 
the agent and the resulting profits is established and therefore, a higher attribution of 
profits is allowed. 
 
 
3.1.3. Limited force of attraction rule combined with an objective escape clause. 
 
                                                     
57 See OECD 2014 Public Discussion Draft on BEPS Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of PE 
Status. OECD 2015 Revised Discussion Draft on BEPS Action 7: Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of 
PE Status. OECD 2015 Final Report. Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of Permanent Establishment 
Status. 
58 See art.12 of the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting.  
59 See the figures expressed in Example 1 of the BEPS 2016 BEPS Action 7. Additional Guidance on the 
Attribution of Profits to Permanent Establishments, in par.21 et seq. where it is illustrated that the State in 
which the PE is present, will be entitled to tax almost the same amount of income as if the PE was not to 
exist. 
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The next category of deviations refers to those provisions in which a limited force of 
attraction rule that refer to sales and other economic or business activities, is accompanied 
with an objective escape clause, i.e. if it is proven that such sales or activities could not 
have been undertaken by the permanent establishment in the ordinary course of its 
activities, resulting profits will not be attributed to the PE60. 
 
The DTCs fitting into this category place on the taxpayer the burden of proving that sales 
or activities could not reasonably have been undertaken by that permanent establishment. 
The only exception is the DTC signed between Argentina and Australia, which employs 
a neutral form:  
 
“If it may reasonably be concluded that those sales or business activities would 
not have been made or carried on but for the existence of that permanent 
establishment or the continued provision by it of goods or services” (emphasis 
added).  
 
The word “reasonably” is also mentioned in these DTCs -being the only exception the 
one signed between Mexico and Sweden”- probably because it is uncontroversial that the 
burden of proving the dissimilarity in the activities performed by the permanent 
establishment and other activities may be difficult to achieve in some situations. The most 
controversial issue to be resolved in each case consists in accurately determine the 
element of comparison, as commented before61.   
 
 
3.1.4. Limited force of attraction rule combined with a subjective escape clause. 
 
Some DTCs also contain an escape clause embedded on the force of attraction rule, but 
referred to the intention of the taxpayer when designing its foreign direct investment 
strategy. Specifically, it is required that sales or economic activities have been carried out 
for reasons other than obtaining a benefit under the Convention62. In this case, it seems 
that the benefit would be the removal of taxing powers by the source State when the 
taxpayer conducts sales or economic activities that cannot be attributed to an existing PE 
as, prima facie, resulting profits will not be taxable by the source State, should a force of 
attraction not exist.  
 
The burden of the proof is again placed on the side of the taxpayer, with the sole exception 
of the Treaties of Mexico with Estonia and Latvia. The test focus on whether reasons 
                                                     
60 Treaties of Argentina (with Australia and Denmark) and of Venezuela (with Denmark and Norway), all 
referring to bussiness and comercial activities, being the DTC signed between Mexico and Sweden an 
exception, as it refers to property alienation. 
61 See section 3.1.1. 
62 Treaties of Chile (with Mexico), of Mexico (with Australia, Bahrain, Barbados, Canada, Chile, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Russia, South Africa, United States, Uruguay), of Panama (with Barbados), of Portugal (with Mexico) 
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other than to obtain tax savings in the source State exist that may justify the adopted 
structure. This requirement is placed alongside the already commented analysis on the 
need for sales or economic activities to be similar to those performed by the existing PE 
in the source jurisdiction.  
 
The very UN MTC Commentaries reflect that some of its members considered that the 
limited force of attraction rule should not be applied when an enterprise has legitimate 
business reasons for choosing not to carry out sales or business activities through its PE63. 
Here, no such terms as “main”, “one of the main” “principal” or “essential” reasons are 
used and therefore, the degree of importance of the business reason seems not to be 
relevant, as long as there is at least one that may help to explain the structure adopted by 
the taxpayer. 
 
 
3.2. LIMITATION OF EXPENSES 
 
None of the OECD MTC versions contain restrictions on the recognition of expenses to 
be attributed to the PE in order to determine its profits. Notwithstanding, at the level of 
the Commentaries and corresponding reports on the subject matter, the OECD did 
introduce some limitations, allegedly deriving from the interpretation of the wording of 
art.7 itself, despite the fact that art.7.3 of the OECD pre-2010 MTC and prior versions 
determine that “there shall be allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred for the 
purposes of the permanent establishment” as if it were a distinct and separate enterprise. 
Our understanding of a unified interpretation of the functionally separate enterprise 
notion present in every DTC Model, necessarily demands that every expense that would 
be recognized to an enterprise in a given jurisdiction, should also be recognized at the 
level of the determination of the profits to be attributed to the PE via art.7. 
 
That said, the UN MTC does expressly contain a limitation on the recognition of deemed 
expenses derived from internal dealings by the PE and its head office, and the PE with 
other PEs within the same enterprise. Specifically, payments made or received by the PE 
in this context in respect of amounts referred to (1) royalties, fees or other similar 
payments in return for the use of patents or other rights, (2) commission payments, for 
specific services performed or for management and (3) interest payments -except in the 
case of financial institutions-. A considerable number of DTCs contain this provision64, 
                                                     
63 UN MTC Commentaries on art.7, par.7. 
64 Treaties of Brazil (with Venezuela), of Cuba (with Austria, Venezuela and Vietnam), of Mexico (with 
Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, India, Indonesia, Latvia, 
Netherlands, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Ukraine and Uruguay), of Panama (with Vietnam), of 
Portugal (with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Venezuela and Vietnam), of Spain (with China, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand and Vietnam), of Uruguay (with Ecuador and Mexico) and of Venezuela 
(with Austria, Barbados, Brazil, China, Cuba, Denmark, Indonesia, Korea, Kuwait, Norway, Portugal, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Vietnam). 
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but also deviations based on it may be found in the Ibero-American DTC network. These 
may be divided in the following subsections: 
 
 
3.2.1. Limitation only referred to expenses, but not to income received from 
internal dealings 
 
The first departure from modelled provisions takes as reference the text of the UN MTC. 
As expressed, not only expenses are limited, but also the computation of gross income, 
as internal dealings favoring a PE are not recognized either. It has to be highlighted that 
a number of Ibero-American DTCs that contain a clause regarding restrictions on 
expenses, do not follow the modelled UN provision, mainly to remove the restriction on 
the attribution of profits derived from internal dealings that imply the recognition of 
amounts charged by the PE, thus entailing an increase of its taxable base65. 
 
The mentioned removal implies to broaden taxing rights from the side of the jurisdiction 
of the PE vis-à-vis those that would arise should the modelled UN provision have been 
adopted. Thus, notional payments are recognized, but not the ones that imply lowering 
the taxable base of the PE. 
 
 
3.2.2. Limitation to equate the recognition of expenses of enterprises and PEs  
 
A second group of deviations is referred to those DTCs that include a clause similar to 
that of art.7.3 OECD pre-2010 MTC, but do not allow deductions for expenses which 
would not be deductible if the PE were a separate enterprise66. This add-on is adequate to 
align the determination of the taxable base of the PE at the domestic level and the 
quantitative limit imposed on the PE jurisdiction at the DTC level. This is so because the 
modeled OECD MTC provision may lead to interpretative issues.  
 
The wording of the modelled provision, stating that “there shall be allowed as deductions 
expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the permanent establishment”, may lead 
to consider that at the DTC level, no limits on the recognition of expenses can be imposed. 
This approach entails at the end of the day to lower the limit of the amount that the source 
State is entitled to tax, as the recognition of more expenses lead to a lower amount to be 
taxed at source.  
 
                                                     
65 Treaties of Brazil (with Ukraine), of Chile (with Canada), of Cuba (with Qatar), of Ecuador (with 
Mexico), of Mexico (with Brazil, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, South Korea, Norway, Poland, 
Romania, Russia, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom and the United States)  of Portugal (with Denmark) 
and of Venezuela (with Canada, Trinidad and Tobago, United Kingdom and the United States). 
66 Treaties of Portugal (with Austria, Belgium, Finland and the United Kingdom). 
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On the other hand, to limit the expenses a PE can deduct at the DTC level would be 
meaningless if these limitations are not aligned with those of domestic law, because then, 
the limit imposed by the DTC will be higher than the amount resulting from the 
calculation of the taxable base at the domestic level. 
 
 
3.2.3. Limitation to link the recognition of expenses to that of domestic law 
 
The third group of deviations also departs from the wording of art.7.3 OECD pre-2010 
MTC. Here, the introduced nuance refers to the fact that expenses must be recognized at 
the domestic law level, for them to be recognized in the DTC context67. As happens with 
the prior commented deviation, i.e. the one referred to the recognition of expenses only 
if these are authorized for enterprises, these provisions aim to align the treatment of 
expenses at the domestic and the DTC level. That said, the difference between both 
deviations lies in the fact that a restriction or recognition of expenses exclusively referred 
to the determination of the taxable base at the level of the PE within domestic law is 
possible in the current commented category, but not in the prior one -that align expenses 
recognized for enterprises with those recognized for PEs at the domestic level-.  
 
This fact is relevant, since DTCs normally prevent the contracting States from 
discriminating a PE vis-à-vis resident enterprises68, but not the other way around, i.e. a 
jurisdiction may recognize more expenses to PEs than to resident enterprises.  
 
A variation of the commented deviation may also be found in some specific DTCs. It 
refers to a wording in which the domestic law is mentioned, but it seems that no specific 
outcomes may be derived from such reference. For instance, art.7.3 of the DTC signed 
between Spain and Ecuador states: 
 
“In the determination of the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be 
allowed as deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the 
permanent establishment, including executive and general administrative 
expenses, whether incurred in the State in which the permanent establishment is 
situated or elsewhere. Such expenses must be substantiated in accordance with 
the law of the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment is situated” 
(emphasis added). 
 
                                                     
67 Treaties of Colombia with India, of Ecuador with Canada, of Mexico (with Lithuania and Qatar), of 
Panama with Qatar, of Portugal with India, of Uruguay with India and of Venezuela with Qatar. See also 
the 2017 Protocol signed between Chile and Peru. 
68 See art.24.3 OECD MTC, art.24.3 UN MTC, art.24.2 US MTC: “The taxation on a permanent 
establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting State has in the other Contracting State shall not be less 
favourably levied in that other State than the taxation levied on enterprises of that other State carrying on 
the same activities”. 
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A similar formula may be derived from art.7.3 of the DTC signed by Mexico with Kuwait, 
and the United Arab Emirates: 
 
“In determining the profits of a permanent establishment, there shall be allowed 
as deductions expenses which are incurred for the purposes of the permanent 
establishment, including executive and general administrative expenses so 
incurred, whether in the State in which the permanent establishment is situated or 
elsewhere, taking into consideration any applicable law or regulations” 
(emphasis added). 
 
The three mentioned DTCs are the ones that display ambiguity in the commented sense. 
It is hard to ascertain the role the mentioned variations may have within art.7.3. Probably 
the most sensible approach would be to examine the issue from a burden of the proof 
perspective. One may sustain that expenses must be substantiated in accordance with the 
requirements envisaged in the domestic law of the contracting States, despite the fact that 
such a reference is redundant, because without it, the result would be the same: DTCs are 
silent regarding burden of the proof issues and therefore, domestic law will necessarily 
be observed to solve them. 
 
On the other hand, one may query whether references to domestic law are made to link 
the recognition of expenses at the domestic level and at the DTC level, as the prior 
commented variations to the modelled provisions do. Notwithstanding, neither of the two 
quoted provisions state so, but only that one must take domestic law into consideration, 
and that one must substantiate expenses in accordance with it. This does not mean that at 
the DTC level, expenses are to be constrained by virtue of domestic law and therefore, 
one cannot derive such a mandate if it is not specifically provided in the text of the 
Convention.  
 
 
3.2.4. Combined variations  
 
There are five clauses found in the Ibero-American DTC network that combine the 
aforementioned variations, namely: 
- Art.7.3 of the DTC signed between Mexico and Australia: it contains a clause 
similar to that on limitation only referred to expenses, but not to income received 
from internal dealings. The existing nuance is that it also requires for payments 
made by the PE have to be also deductible if the PE were a resident enterprise. 
- Art.7.3 of the DTC signed between Mexico and Romania: it also contains a clause 
similar to that on limitation only referred to expenses, but not to income received 
from internal dealings. This time, such clause is accompanied by the following 
caveat: “These provisions shall be applied in accordance with the domestic laws 
of the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment is situated”. 
- Art.7.4 of the DTC signed between Venezuela and the United States: this 
provision is built in accordance with the wording of art.7.3 UN MTC, but it 
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removes the exception on the restriction of notional payments of interests that 
permitted PEs of banks to deduct such amounts. Also, it is clearly stated that a 
contracting State might impose restrictions on deductions, as long as these 
limitations are coherent with the concept of net income. Such mandate might be 
labelled as self-serving, because the idea of net income is necessarily defined by 
the domestic tax laws of each jurisdiction. 
- Art.7.3 of the DTC signed between Portugal and Denmark: the wording of this 
provision is almost identical to the one of art.7.3 UN MTC. The only change 
regards the fact that, for expenses to be authorized, they should be deductible if 
the PE were a separate enterprise. Please notice that in a previous subsection a 
reference was made to limitation of expenses in accordance to those separate 
enterprises could deduct, but introduced within a clause similar to OECD pre-
2010 MTC. Here, the wording departs from art.7.3 UN MTC. 
- Art.7.3 of the DTC signed between Cuba and Qatar: this is a mixed provision, in 
the sense that Qatar adopts an OECD approach and lets every expense connected 
to the PE, while for Cuba, a restriction identical to that enshrined in art.7.3 of the 
UN MTC is envisaged. 
 
 
3.3. DEVIATIONS REFERRED TO THE SCOPE OF ART.7 
 
From now on, all the deviations that will be analyzed refer to aspects alien to the wording 
of both the OECD MTC and the UN MTC. The first category of such departures refers to 
the scope of the article in which business profits are governed, mainly to include in its 
scope income derived from the use of particular structures. 
 
It is worth mentioning that these provisions seem to derive not from concerns displayed 
by Ibero-American countries but their counterparts. For instance, the four DTCs that 
Australia has signed with Ibero-American partners include the following clause69: 
 
“Where: 
a) a resident of a Contracting State is beneficially entitled, whether directly 
or through one or more interposed trust estates, to a share of the business 
profits of an enterprise carried on in the other Contracting State by the 
trustee of a trust estate other than a trust estate which is treated as a 
company for tax purposes; and 
b) in relation to that enterprise, that trustee would, in accordance with the 
principles of Article 5, have a permanent establishment in that other State, 
the enterprise carried on by the trustee shall be deemed to be a business carried on 
in the other State by that resident through a permanent establishment situated 
                                                     
69 Treaties of Argentina with Australia, of Chile with Australia, of Mexico with Australia (Protocol) and 
of Spain with Australia. Also, the DTC signed between Spain and New Zealand include an identical clause. 
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therein and that share of business profits shall be attributed to that permanent 
establishment”. 
 
Also, in three articles signed by Austria, a provision referred to silent partnerships (“stille 
gesellschaft”) may be found70:  
 
“The provisions of this Article are also to be applied to income derived by a silent 
partner from his participation in a silent partnership (stille Gesellschaft) under 
Austrian law”. 
 
Germany also included the following clause referred to partnerships in two DTCs71: 
 
“This Article shall also apply to income from participation in a partnership. It shall 
further apply to remuneration received by a partner from the partnership for 
activities in the service of the partnership and for the granting of loans or the 
provision of assets, where such remuneration is attributable under the tax law of 
the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment is situated to the 
income derived by a partner from that permanent establishment”. 
 
Finally, the following clause was included in the DTC signed between Spain and Tunisia:  
 
“Income derived by a resident of a Contracting State from an "association en 
participation", a "sociét  de fait" or a company subject to the obligatory fiscal 
transparency ruling, who is operating in the other Contracting State, may be taxed 
in that other State”. 
 
Two common issues may arise within the framework of these clauses. The first one refers 
to their compatibility with the provisions referred to the subjective scope of the DTC 
itself, typically embedded in arts 1 and 4. If a silent partnership is not entitled to access 
the benefits of the DTC due to the content of these articles, the provisions contained in 
art.7 would not be applicable. The second one refers to the effect of this clause with 
respect to the other provisions of the DTC. Albeit art.7 of the mentioned DTCs contain a 
clause that regard this provision as subsidiary vis-à-vis articles that envisage a specific 
treatment for different items of income, the analyzed clauses in principle do not take 
precedence over the rest of the articles referred to the allocation of taxing powers.  
 
 
3.4. INSURANCE CLAUSES 
 
Insurance clauses embedded in art.7 are quite varying, depending on their scope and 
limitations on the source State power to tax. One feature that all these clauses share is that 
                                                     
70 Treaties of Brazil with Austria, of Portugal with Austria and of Spain with Austria. 
71 Treaties of Costa Rica with Germany and of Uruguay with Germany. 
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they confer broader taxing powers to the source State if compared with the inclusion of 
an insurance clause within the definition of the “permanent establishment” concept, as 
the attribution of the power to tax income to the source has not to be necessarily connected 
to the economic activities performed by the PE.  
 
Hereby, the different types of classes will be brought into discussion, from the ones that 
do not impose limits to the source State to those that establish a quantitative limit to source 
State taxing powers. 
 
Those DTCs that ensure unlimited taxing powers to the source State are few72, and some 
include a clause that oblige the States to consult each other in case an amendment of the 
provision is needed due to a change on their domestic law that entail significant variations 
in the tax treatment of the income derived from insurance activities73. 
 
The DTCs signed by Argentina with Norway and Italy limit source taxing powers to 
“insurance covering property situated in the other Contracting State or persons which are 
residents of that other State, at the time of the conclusion of the insurance contract”. Also, 
the provision embedded in each Convention has a singularity. The former applies also to 
reinsurance, “but only where reinsurance premiums are paid by an insurance enterprise 
which is a resident of that other State”. The latter states that when the insurance contract 
refers to persons which are residents of that other State, the payer of the premium has to 
be also a resident of the very same jurisdiction, i.e. the source one. 
 
A somehow particular couple of provisions that are worth mentioning are contained in 
the DTCs signed by Mexico with Australia and New Zealand. The design of these clauses 
is, to say the least, peculiar. The one agreed with New Zealand states the following: 
 
“Nothing in this Article shall affect any provisions of the laws of either 
Contracting State at any time in force as they affect the taxation of any income or 
profits from any form of insurance. For the purposes of the application of this 
paragraph, an insurance enterprise of New Zealand shall, except in regard to 
reinsurance, be deemed to have a permanent establishment in Mexico if it collects 
premiums in Mexico or insures risks situated therein through a person other than 
an agent of an independent status to whom paragraph 8 of Article 5 applies”. 
 
First, it is stated that nothing in art.7 will preclude the source State to tax the income 
derived from insurance -in the DTC with Australia, the scope is restricted to “insurance 
with non-residents”-. But after granting unlimited rights to tax to the source State, it is 
stated that “for the purpose of this paragraph”, an insurance permanent establishment 
definition is provided when Australian or New Zealand companies perform this business 
in Mexico. The purpose of the ampleness of the scope of the permanent establishment 
                                                     
72 Treaties of Argentina (with Canada and Russia) and Chile with the Czech Republic. 
73 Treaties of Argentina with Australia, of Spain with Australia and of Venezuela with Saudi Arabia. 
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definition referred to the insurance business remain unknown, because the very paragraph 
in which such definition is provided, states that no limits on the taxing powers of the 
source State are imposed. As the concept of permanent establishment becomes thereby 
irrelevant, it is hard to see the usefulness of the second part of the mentioned paragraphs. 
 
Another set of DTCs grant taxing rights to the source State, but limited in accordance 
with the gross amount of the premiums derived from insurance or reinsurance covering 
property situated in the other Contracting State or persons which are residents of that 
other State at the time of the conclusion of the insurance contract, ranging from 2,5% of 
this amount74, to 5% (for reinsurance premiums) or 10% (rest of the premiums) -unless 
the premium is attributable to a PE-75, to a 10%76. It must be highlighted that the limit on 
source taxation refers exclusively to premiums.  
 
 
3.5. ANTI-DEFERRAL CLAUSES 
 
A further category of provisions refers to the taxation of business income attributable to 
a PE even when payments are deferred until it ceases to exist. In this sense, these clauses 
do not establish a timing attribution criterion, but determine that irrespective of the timing 
method established in the domestic law of the jurisdiction in which the PE lies, the income 
may be taxed by this State, even if in the fiscal year to which the income is considered to 
be obtained by the PE, it does not exist anymore.  
 
It is noticeable that these clauses are quite similar in their construction, but their scope 
vary. A first category that may be mentioned is that of provisions applicable whenever a 
PE obtains income, irrespective of the label this income may have. This is, the defined 
mandate is extensible not only to art.7, but also to provisions impacting PEs, such as those 
included in articles referred to the tax treatment of dividends, interests, royalties, capital 
gains, independent personal services and other income77. 
 
Other clauses are only applicable within the realm of art.7, because they start with the 
formula “In applying paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article…” and so, the anti-deferral rule 
embedded in art.7 would not be applicable to other articles78. 
 
 
3.6. DEFINITION OF THE TERM “PROFITS” 
 
                                                     
74 Treaties of Argentina (with Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom). 
75 Treaties of Argentina with Chile and Chile (with Argentina and Australia). 
76 Treaty of Spain with New Zealand. 
77 Treaties of Chile with France, of Mexico with Australia and of Venezuela with the United States. 
78 Treaties of Chile with the United Kindgom and of Mexico (with France, Italy and the United Kingdom). 
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Some DTCs within the Ibero-American network contain a specific definition of the term 
“profits”, “business profits” or “industrial or commercial profits”, which will be relevant 
to define the scope of art.7. Some of them do not add significant variations nor 
clarifications to the notion that may be inferred from the wording of the mentioned article. 
One may mention the following two provisions in that regard: 
- Art.7.4 of the DTC signed between Venezuela and Saudi Arabia: “the term 
‘business profits’ includes, but is not limited to income derived from 
manufacturing, mercantile, banking, insurance, from the operation of inland 
transportation, the furnishing of services and the rental of tangible personal 
movable property. Such a term does not include the performance of personal 
services by an individual either as an employee or in an independent capacity” 
(emphasis added).  
- Art.7.5 of the DTC signed between Portugal and the United Kingdom: “the term 
‘industrial or commercial profits’ means income derived by an enterprise from the 
conduct of a trade business, including income derived by an enterprise from the 
furnishing of services of employees or other personnel and dividends, interests or 
royalties effectively connected with a trade or business carried on through a 
permanent establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting State has in the 
other Contracting State, but the term does not include dividends, interests or 
royalties not so connected; nor does it include remuneration for personal 
(including professional) services” (emphasis added). 
 
Should these provisions not exist, the scope of the DTCs would not vary, as both include 
the regular subsidiarity clause that turns art.7 applicable when none of the provisions of 
the DTC are. Also, the open formulation derived from using the expression “but is not 
limited to” and “including”, is in line with the mentioned interpretation. Also, the second 
clause refer to dividends, interests and royalties effectively connected to a permanent 
establishment, in line with the clauses embedded in the articles referred to these items of 
income79, that call back for art.7 to be applied. 
 
On the other hand, the provisions that include relevant definitions on “profits” are: 
- Art.7.1 in fine of the DTC signed between Spain and Kuwait: “payments of any 
kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, 
commercial or scientific equipment, shall be deemed to be profits of an enterprise 
to which the provisions of this Article shall apply”. 
- Art.7.8 of the DTC signed between Mexico and Austria: “The term ‘profits’ as 
used in this Article includes the profits derived by any partner from his 
participation in a partnership and, in the case of Austria, from a participation in a 
sleeping partnership (Stille Gesellschaft) created under Austrian law”. 
                                                     
79 See arts.10.4 (dividends), 11.5 (interests) and 12.3 (royalties) of the OECD MTC and arts.10.4 
(dividends), 11.5 (interests) and 12.4 (royalties) of the UN MTC. 
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- Art.7.8 of the DTC signed between Venezuela and Austria: “The term ‘profits’ as 
used in this Article includes the profits derived by any partner from his 
participation in a partnership”. 
 
The first clause brings payments derived from the use of, or the right to use, industrial, 
commercial or scientific equipment, out of the article referred to royalties80, to be 
included as business profits in art.7. The usual qualification issues derived from the 
interpretation of such concepts may arise.  
 
The other two clauses deal with income derived by the partners of a partnership. 
Notwithstanding, it must be mentioned that to state that the term “profits” include this 
type of income, does not preclude the application of the subsidiarity clause, i.e. other 
articles such as the one referred to dividends may take precedence if the income fits into 
its definition. Also, issues derived from the scope of the DTC may arise, as both articles 
state that “profits” comprise those derived by “any partner”, without distinguishing 
whether the partner is to be considered a person resident of one of the contracting States 
or not. That said, it seems clear that in such a case, as the defined concept is the term 
“profits”, such provision does not impact the articles referred to the scope of the DTC.  
 
 
3.7. OTHER CLAUSES 
 
Within art.7 of the DTCs that conform the Ibero-American network, one may find also 
clauses that cannot be classified within the above-mentioned categories. Therefore, this 
section is built upon heterogeneous provisions that do not display uniform characteristics. 
The low number of nuances that depart from the commented groups show that, generally 
speaking, Ibero-American countries tend not to display sporadic concerns on the article 
referred to business profits, being these a positive feature for the aggregated analysis of 
the DTC network. Due to their peculiar nature, each clause will be separately analyzed. 
 
The first article to be analyzed refers to the taxation of business profits within Decision 
578 of the Andean Community enacting an Income and Capital Tax Treaty, in force since 
January 1st, 2005, the members of which are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. This 
Convention does not follow any known DTC Model. Indeed, the term “permanent 
establishment” is completely absent. According to article 6,  
 
                                                     
80 Art.12.3 of the DTC signed between Spain and Kuwait: “The term "royalties" as used in this Article 
means payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of 
literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematography films and works on films, tapes or other means 
of reproduction for use in connection with television or radio broadcasting, any patent, trade mark, design 
or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information (know-how) concerning industrial, commercial 
or scientific experience”. Also, it is relevant to mention that art.12.2 establish a 5% maximum rate for 
royalties to be taxed at source. 
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“Profits from business activities shall be taxable only in the Member Country in 
which they are derived […] where an enterprise carries on activities in two or 
more Member Countries, each of them may tax the profits generated in their 
territory, whereby each Country shall apply its internal rules regarding the 
determination of the taxable base as if it were a distinct, independent and separate 
enterprise, but avoiding double taxation in accordance with the rules of this 
Decision”. 
 
The mentioned article establishes a territorial rule to tax business profits, meaning that 
each country may tax business income that arises in its territory, in accordance with their 
domestic provisions. If an enterprise obtain income generated in two or more countries, 
the taxable base must be determined in accordance with rules equal to those that would 
apply to independent, separate enterprises. Double taxation must be avoided by applying 
the exemption method in those States which, in accordance with their domestic laws, have 
the right to tax the said income81. If two or more States consider that a specific income 
derives from their territory, they must consult each other as to achieve the purpose of the 
Convention, i.e. “to avoid double taxation on the same items of income or elements of 
capital at the community level”82. 
 
Article 7 of the DTC signed between Argentina and Bolivia also determines a territorial 
distribution of taxing powers. Specifically, it is stated that: 
 
“Profits resulting from business activities shall be taxable only by the Contracting 
State in which such business activities have been carried on. Where an enterprise 
carries on activities in both Contracting States, each of them may tax the income, 
gains or profits derived from within its territory”. 
 
Such clause pose interpretative problems, as the fact that triggers taxation is not to obtain 
business profits in a given territory -as happens within the already commented Andean 
Decision-, but to perform business activities in it. Depending on how one define such 
concept, results may vary. For instance, would sales to retailers performed through a 
webpage be considered as the performance of a business activity in the jurisdiction in 
which the buyers are located? Is it necessary for the enterprise to have some sort of 
physical presence in the State from which is deriving profits? Again, the concept must be 
determined in accordance with the domestic law of each State. In case of source-source 
conflicts, the Convention -which does not specify any method to eliminate double 
taxation, due to the fact that a territorial approach is adopted- states that the competent 
authorities of the Contracting States shall hold consultations with each other and 
exchange the information necessary for settling by mutual agreement any difficulty or 
doubt which may arise. 
 
                                                     
81 See art.3 of the Decision, named “tax jurisdiction”. 
82 See art.20 of the Decision, named “interpretation and application”. 
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The rest of the clauses are incorporated into modelled DTCs, but again, their particular 
and heterogeneous nature constitutes reason enough to study each one separately. 
 
The DTC signed between Argentina and Germany contains a provision defining a limit 
on the attribution of profits to PEs in art.7.7: 
 
“Where a resident of the Federal Republic of Germany has a permanent 
establishment in the Argentine Republic, the Argentine tax on the profits of that 
permanent establishment, whether levied on the permanent establishment itself, 
on the above-mentioned resident of the Federal Republic of Germany or on both, 
shall not exceed the tax which is applicable under the Argentine law to profits of 
a company resident in the Argentine Republic plus 15% of these profits as 
calculated after the deduction of the above-mentioned tax on company profits” 
(emphasis added). 
  
This provision is clearly at odds with the provision on non-discrimination of PEs 
enshrined in art.24.283. One might raise the issue of which of the two clauses would 
prevail, as they seem in conflict, being probably the lex specialis criterion the one that 
should be considered in that case. Notwithstanding, this solution cannot be considered as 
adequate. One must take into account that the referred provision raises the limit on 
taxation of business profits established in art.7.2, but it remains to be considered as, in 
fact, a mere limit (see the added emphasis on the wording copied above). In this sense, 
the non-discrimination rule demands that, at the domestic law level, PEs receive a not 
less favorable treatment than domestic enterprises. Thus, the amount of taxes due at 
source calculated in accordance with the domestic law if this rule is honored will never 
arise above the referred 15%. It indeed will not raise even above the “profits of a company 
resident in the Argentine Republic”. Therefore, this clause contains an empty mandate.  
 
Art.7.8 of the DTC between Chile and Australia contains a rule comprising an agreed 
statute of limitation: 
 
“No adjustments to the profits attributable to a permanent establishment of an 
enterprise for a year of income shall be made by a Contracting State after the 
expiration of seven years from the date on which the enterprise has completed the 
tax filing requirements of that State for that year of income. The provisions of this 
paragraph shall not apply in the case of fraud, gross negligence or willful default 
or where, within that period of seven years, an audit into the profits of the 
enterprise has been initiated by either State”. 
 
                                                     
83 Art.24.2 of the DTC signed between Argentina and Germany states: “The taxation on a permanent 
establishment which an enterprise of a Contracting State has in the other Contracting State shall not be less 
favourable levied in the other State than the taxation levied on enterprises of that other State carrying on 
the same activities”. 
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Here, the contracting States have agreed on a common statute of limitations of 7 years 
applicable in cases of bona fide performance by the taxpayer. It seems clear that the 
existence of “fraud, gross negligence or willful default” will be considered by taking into 
account the domestic definitions of such concepts of the jurisdiction of the tax authorities.  
 
As regards the calculation of the limitation term, this 7 years’ period is independent from 
the domestic statute of limitations of each State, i.e. if due to domestic rules, the tax 
authorities are not allowed anymore to assess the taxpayer, the period contained in art.7.8 
does not entail the extension of the domestic deadlines. Notwithstanding, it is important 
to note that the limitation period of 7 years will not be applicable in either jurisdiction if, 
before, the tax authorities of Australia or Chile initiate an audit, as the provision states in 
fine. 
 
Chilean DTCs with Australia (art.7.9), Czech Republic (7.8) and the United Kingdom 
(7.8) contain a clause that prevents limitations contained in art.7 to be applied to taxation 
on profits attributable to a PE situated in Chile under both the First Category Tax and the 
Additional Tax. Also, the first two mentioned DTCs establish the requirement that the 
First Category Tax is fully creditable in computing the amount of the Additional Tax.   
 
On the other hand, the Chile-UK DTC determines in its art.7.9 that nothing shall affect 
the application of the existing provisions of the Chilean legislation Decree Law 600 
(Foreign Investment Statute) as they are in force at the time of signature of this 
Convention and as they may be amended from time to time without changing the general 
principle thereof.  
 
Finally, art.7.8 of the DTC signed between Uruguay and Liechtenstein contains a clause 
on the elimination of double taxation that arises due to the taxing power the source State 
has over the income attributable to the PE: 
 
“Where, in accordance with paragraph 2, a Contracting Party adjusts the profits 
that are attributable to a permanent establishment of an enterprise of one of the 
Contracting Parties and taxes accordingly profits of the enterprise that have been 
charged to tax in the other Party, the other Party shall, to the extent necessary to 
eliminate double taxation on these profits, make an appropriate adjustment to the 
amount of the tax charged on those profits. In determining such adjustment, the 
competent authorities of the Contracting Parties shall if necessary consult each 
other”. 
 
The chosen method would be the credit of foreign taxes paid on the profits of the PE. This 
provision is relevant because art.23 establishes, for Liechtenstein residents, the exemption 
with progression method to be applied to active income. Here, probably the most 
reasonable solution would be to let the taxpayer choose which of the mentioned methods 
prefers to apply. 
